39 ideas
| 9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
| 9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
| 9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
| 9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
| 10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
| 10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
| 9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
| 10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
| 9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
| 10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
| 9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
| 21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
| 9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |